ESPN Keith Law Blog

The Red Sox have made a minor habit of picking up a once-good, broken-down starter on a one-year deal, reaping modest returns but never quite hitting the big score they were hoping to land. Assuming he passes his physical on Jan. 7, Brad Penny's contract would fit that pattern.

If we figure that the downside of Penny's deal is probably seasons like Wade Miller's 2005 or Bartolo Colon's 2008 -- both were moderately effective when pitching, and neither actively hurt the club -- the risk doesn't seem all that high, and the reward runs anywhere up to Penny's outstanding performances in 2006 and 2007. The odds are against the latter scenario, of course, but a short-duration deal for a few million dollars is probably about right given the risk. And if Penny gives the Red Sox even 100 innings of league-average pitching, he could help them manage the development of Clay Buchholz or get them through an injury to any of their four established starters.

I'm surprised that the Penny deal doesn't include some kind of option for 2010 for Boston, whether a club option or a vesting option based on Penny's starts or innings pitched. You can only sign a player to terms he and his agents will accept, of course, but if you're putting your money on the line for a player who could, in theory, miss the year and have shoulder surgery on your dime, shouldn't you also be able to participate in more of the upside if the player plays well and dispels doubts about his health? A team could even structure such a deal with a club option if the player throws at least, say, 120 innings, that becomes a mutual option (giving the player the opportunity to avoid the club option) if he throws 180 innings; this caps the team's upside, so the player has an incentive to keep playing and playing well, and the agent doesn't have to worry that he gave away the farm.

It's possible that Penny's side just wouldn't accept a team option of any stripe, but the team option should be more common in deals like this one than it actually is.

With the signing of Randy Johnson to a one-year deal, the Giants made another move toward 2009 respectability, if not outright contention in a weak division, without doing any damage to their long-term rebuilding plan.

Despite his age (he turned 45 in September), Johnson showed that he has something left in the tank in 2008, making 30 starts, striking out 22.4 percent of opposing hitters and posting an ERA better than league average.

He's been pitching for a few years with reduced stuff, but his fastball is still solid-average at 89-93, and his slider remains sharp, at 82-86 mph with good tilt and late depth to it. His third pitch, a splitter, is a weaker offering; he gets on top of the pitch, but it has a slow dive rather than the hard bottom more often associated with a splitter. Right-handed hitters can time the pitch because its drop starts early.

He still has good deception, especially against left-handers, but tends to pitch in the upper-middle part of the zone too often with his fastball, which, combined with the gradual drop in his velocity, has turned him into a fly-ball pitcher over the past few years. San Francisco's park is an ideal spot for a pitcher with this tendency, because it is one of the least homer-friendly parks (in terms of converting fly balls into home runs) in baseball.

It gives the Giants one of the strongest rotations in the league, with the reigning Cy Young Award winner at the top in Tim Lincecum, a potential No. 1 starter in Matt Cain and a breakout candidate for 2009 in lefty Jonathan Sanchez. Barry Zito now becomes the fifth starter; consider the contrast between the Giants' philosophy in signing Zito, who was all name but declining performance-wise, to a seven-year contract that cost them a draft pick, and their philosophy in signing Johnson to a short-term deal that does not cost them a pick.

The Giants can now trade a starter for offensive help, and their offense does need it; San Francisco was the first team in a decade to fail to hit 100 home runs in a full season. The Giants also had the fourth-worst OBP in the league and finished just three runs ahead of the NL-worst Padres.

They still need help at two infield spots (third or first base, with Pablo Sandoval at the other spot, and shortstop or second base, with Edgar Renteria at the other spot), or the Giants could try to upgrade in either outfield corner, with center field already committed to Aaron Rowand for the rest of eternity. While it would be difficult for the Giants to trade Sanchez or even Cain, they could increase their chances of contention in 2009 with the right deal, and they have more young, high-end pitching on the way in Madison Bumgarner and Tim Alderson.

You may have heard that Johnson is just five wins short of the hallowed 300 mark, which remains (despite frequent comments to the contrary by voters) a benchmark for Hall of Fame induction, one that has kept highly qualified players like Bert Blyleven out.

Johnson should be a lock for induction regardless -- the third-highest strikeout total of all time, five Cy Young Awards and three second-place finishes, etc. -- but reaching 300 wins may increase his vote total when he does reach the ballot. Of course, perhaps the major variable in determining whether a pitcher wins a game or not is the run support he receives from his team, and the Giants' offense remains a weak spot, so reaching five wins will likely take Johnson longer than it would had he signed with another team.

Brewers general manager Doug Melvin is absolutely right with his comments to ESPN's Buster Olney -- the system of awarding draft picks for the loss of free agents is broken.

Melvin's argument, that the Elias formula is inaccurate (it is) and out of date (ditto), is dead on, as the relative rankings of players often defy both common sense and even a superficial bit of sabermetric analysis. But rather than revising the system by monkeying with the Elias formula, why not go one better and scrap the system entirely?

Owners argue that the idea behind taking a draft pick from the team that signs a top free agent and giving it to the team that lost the free agent is just a matter of compensating the latter team, with the presumption that large-market clubs will typically be in the former category while small-market clubs will typically be in the latter.

Not only has this not been the case -- the Red Sox's outstanding 2005 draft was built on compensatory picks -- it's another example of owners taking advantage of the economic ignorance of fans and writers who are yelling and screaming for a salary cap right now. (Salary caps in sports are just wealth transfers from players to owners.)

The real intent of compensatory picks was to try to place a drag on free-agent salaries: A team should be willing to pay less for a free agent if part of the price of signing him is a lost draft pick.

In some cases this year, those attached draft picks aren't just dragging down salaries but are limiting markets entirely. Signing Jason Varitek will cost a team its highest unprotected draft pick; the same goes for Juan Cruz and Orlando Cabrera. All three of these players -- and perhaps others -- are facing reduced interest from clubs because they are not deemed worthy of the loss of a pick. Unless you're the Yankees, where you might only be giving up a fourth-round pick for signing a player because you've signed higher-rated free agents already, you don't want to surrender a first- or second-round pick to sign a catcher with a bat that's below replacement level.

Eliminating draft-pick compensation would also boost the trade market. Right now, a team with a top player headed for free agency may look to trade him a year or half a year before it loses him, but it can always retain him and hope to obtain one or two draft picks when he leaves. Without that alternative, a team that's out of the playoff race in July would have every incentive to trade its potential free agents, because holding on to them until season's end would mean receiving no value at all when they depart.

More trades means more fan interest and more media coverage, and that's good for baseball, while also being good for people who make a living writing and talking about trades.

The draft-pick anachronism will probably be eliminated from free agency only if the owners -- who have no reason to want the picks eliminated -- can convince the union to agree to a hard slotting system in the Rule 4 Draft, something the union, at the behest of player agents, has been unwilling to grant in past negotiations.

This is, from both an economic perspective and a fairness perspective, a good thing, as a slotting system in the draft is yet another wealth transfer, again to the billionaire owners, but this time from amateur players who typically come from modest means and who more than likely will earn the majority of the money they make in baseball in their initial signing bonus.

These players are already somewhat deprived of the opportunity to earn bonuses commensurate with their actual market value because of the existence of a draft; hard slotting would simply exacerbate the problem. As long as the union is willing to fight for amateur players -- who are actually union members at the time they're drafted -- the silly and often counterproductive system of awarding draft picks as compensation for lost free agents will persist.

Give the Yankees credit: They're not some nouveau riche team throwing their money around on whatever shiny baubles they come across in free agency. Signing three of the top four free agents on the market is a sign that they have excellent taste, even if they don't seem to have a credit limit.

The signing of free agent Mark Teixeira fills a hole that has glared more and more every year of this decade at first base.

He's probably the best defensive player relative to his position on the Yankees now, and could be one of only two or three who are above average depending on how the rest of the roster shakes out. He adds significant power to a lineup that had just two players slug over .500 this past year, and his .410 OBP in 2008 would have led the Yankees by 18 points.

Coupled with the loss of Jason Giambi, the signing of Teixeira means a net gain to the Yankees of four to five wins, considering both his bat and his defense. He also eliminates the need the Yankees had for a right-handed caddy for Giambi, since Teixeira is a true switch-hitter with power and patience from both sides of the plate. The Yanks still have to find a solution in center field, unless they decide to give Melky Cabrera the job again and live with the consequences if he continues to struggle. However, if they re-sign Andy Pettitte, they're just about done.

Although the Angels pulled out of the Teixeira bidding earlier in the week, they are the team most directly hurt by its inability to sign Teixeira, because the Angels' offense is weak without him. Unless Vladimir Guerrero suddenly gets healthy and hits like he did before knee and leg problems sapped him of much of his power, the Angels don't have an impact bat in their lineup.

There's an even chance, at worst, that they don't have a hitter who draws 60 walks, hits 30 home runs or slugs .500 next year, which leaves them very reliant on their run prevention (which is strong, and may get stronger if they sign free-agent closer Brian Fuentes) to contend in an improved AL West. The only free agent who would make any sense at all for the Angels would be Adam Dunn, who could play first base. But he's not their kind of hitter at all, and there's no reason to expect him to be an asset defensively there.

The Red Sox were in on the Teixeira chase until the last moment, and I have to wonder if they feel that they were used to drive up the price for the Yankees. Still, Boston is in good shape offensively and defensively without him. The Red Sox are still hoping that Mike Lowell returns at least mostly to form, but they're set at first base in the short term with Kevin Youkilis and the long term with top prospect Lars Anderson reaching Double-A this year at age 20.

The move also hurts the Brewers and Blue Jays, each of whom will receive a draft pick from the Yankees as compensation for the loss of a free agent. Because Teixeira's Elias rating is higher than those of CC Sabathia and A.J. Burnett, the Angels now get the Yankees' first-round pick, pushing the pick the Brewers receive down to the second round (probably 40 picks below where it would have been had the Yanks not signed Teixeira) and the pick the Blue Jays receive down to the third round (31 picks below where it would have been).

The Blue Jays are in an unenviable position now, staring up at three clearly superior teams despite having a roster that would contend in just about every other division. It may now make sense to explore trading core players like Vernon Wells and even Roy Halladay, although the latter's no-trade clause may limit the return.

Arizona signed Felipe Lopez to a one-year contract, giving the Diamondbacks a low-risk look at a former first-round pick who has been a disappointment for most of his big-league career, since he was rushed to the majors by Toronto in 2001. Despite his up-and-down (mostly down) history, Lopez has ability and I like the chance this signing gives Arizona to catch one of his up periods.

You wouldn't know it from his stat lines, but Lopez has good raw tools. He can run, albeit not quite as well as he did before he started putting on weight; he has at least average raw power; he has good bat speed; and once upon a time he was a rangy shortstop with a good arm. He's lost much of this to indolence, seldom putting forth the effort required to convert his tools into performance outside of his one outstanding year in 2005. His midseason release in 2008 seemed to be a wake-up call, which, combined with some extraordinary luck, led to the best 169 plate appearances of his career. He's capable of sustaining some parts of that surge, and a .275/.350/.420 season with average defense at second base and value on the bases is within reach if he shows up in shape and sustains his effort level all season. That would make him an above-average second baseman at a below-average salary, and he could easily slug .450 or more given his raw power and the homer-friendly ballpark in Phoenix.

The signing does have a downside for Arizona. Orlando Hudson's defense was declining, but still above-average, and Lopez is likely to be a downgrade, which would leave the Snakes with an average or worse fielder at every infield position, which might turn Brandon Webb homicidal by the All-Star break. Lopez entered 2008 in a walk year and still was out of shape and playing in first gear for much of the season, so there's no guarantee being in a walk year in 2009 will lead him to fare any better. Those caveats are why he was available for one year and a salary more typical of a player going through arbitration for the first or second time, but at least this one-year deal comes with a chance for some upside.

Cleveland has taken a risk by signing Kerry Wood to a two-year, $20.5 million contract. But if he stays healthy, the Indians will have acquired the best closer on the market at a discount to the going rate set by Francisco Rodriguez and the Mets.

Cleveland's 2008 season turned sour for a number of reasons, and a bad bullpen was one of them. The Indians underperformed in their runs scored and runs allowed totals by four to five wins and were particularly bad in close games, going 43-52 in games decided by three runs or fewer. Only one Indians reliever ranked in the top 50 in baseball in expected wins added, which measures a reliever's performance while taking into account the situation (score, inning, men on base, number of outs) the reliever inherits.

Cleveland's Opening Day closer, Joe Borowski, posted a 7.56 ERA in 16 2/3 innings before he was released. Its best set-up man from 2007, Rafael Betancourt, took a major step back and became wilder and more homer-prone. After allowing three runs on Aug. 5, Betancourt was back to his old self the rest of the way, but it was too late for him to salvage Cleveland's season.

Wood alone won't solve the Indians' bullpen problems, but he'll help, and having Wood instead of Borowski from the start of the 2008 season probably would have at least delayed, if not eliminated, the impetus to deal Sabathia.

Wood had no arm problems in his first full year in relief, although he missed a few weeks with back soreness and a blister on his index finger. He still threw more innings than Brian Fuentes and just two fewer than Rodriguez. His stuff translated well to the relief role: He showed a mid-90s four-seamer with good life and a low-80s slider with a very sharp, late break. He threw strikes (issuing half the unintentional walks that K-Rod did) and was very aggressive in attacking hitters. He's likely to give up a few more long balls this year, but as long as he's healthy, he'll be a big upgrade over what Cleveland used in the ninth inning last season. The contract limits Cleveland's risk if Wood does get hurt again, and the third year will kick in only if he's healthy and effective.

The signing leaves Fuentes as the one proven closer in his prime on the market, with the Angels, Cardinals and Tigers all looking for someone to pitch the ninth inning. Juan Cruz, who has the stuff but not the experience, remains available for a team willing to take the risk of developing him into a proven closer.

On paper, the Yankees have one of the best rotations in baseball, perhaps the best if you feel optimistic and are willing to gift them with 30 starts apiece from A.J. Burnett and Joba Chamberlain.

Burnett has No. 1 starter stuff -- sitting in the mid-90s with a hammer curve, a plus changeup he should use more, and a cutter he just started using in the last year or so to give hitters another thing to worry about. He has no major weaknesses on the mound. He's not prone to the long ball, not too wild, he gets hitters on both sides of the plate out and he misses a ton of bats. That last point is particularly important for a pitcher going to the Yankees, who look like they're going to have a below-average defensive club, and perhaps a bad one, depending on what they do in center field and how much more rope they're willing to extend to second baseman Robinson Cano. He can be prone to the One Bad Inning, but he's not in Javy Vazquez territory.

There are two major drawbacks to a Burnett signing of more than one year. One is that he doesn't always pitch up to his stuff; last year, he had a 4.96 ERA at the All-Star break, and over three years with Toronto he didn't post a single-season ERA under 3.75. Yet he finished his three years in Toronto on a tear, with a 2.72 ERA, 105 strikeouts against 29 walks in 94 1/3 innings, and dominant outings against the Yankees (four starts, 32 1/3 innings, five earned runs), Rays (two starts) and White Sox (one start) after the 2008 All-Star break. If he pitches like that over a full season, he will be a Cy Young contender. But he hasn't pitched like that over a full season at any point in his career, and he has only pitched like that in years when he had a significant financial incentive to do so (his walk years and his last pre-arbitration year).

The other is the frequency with which he takes the mound. Burnett has, with some reason, earned a reputation as a pitcher who will only pitch if his arm feels 100 percent, even though most pitchers pitch from time to time with some soreness or mild discomfort. Burnett has had only one serious arm injury in his pro career -- the blown elbow ligament that cost him most of the 2003 season -- but has missed time with "minor" arm problems that never required surgery. As a result, he has thrown only 200 innings in a season three times (the aforementioned years when there was money at stake), and has only made 30 starts in a season twice. An optimistic forecast would only give him 125 or so starts across the five years of this contract with the Yankees.

I've seen Burnett compared to Carl Pavano by fans, but the comparison doesn't hold. Pavano was more injury-prone at the time he signed with the Yankees than Burnett has been; Pavano had shoulder or elbow trouble in just about every season of his career until he rattled off two straight healthy years with Florida. Pavano also had nowhere near Burnett's raw stuff, nor his ability to induce strikeouts or ground balls. It is, of course, possible that Burnett's tenure with the Yankees will resemble Pavano's; pitchers do get hurt, and Burnett has some affinity for the trainer's room. But Burnett brings an upside to the table that Pavano never did: that of a shutdown No. 1 starter who, in the Yankees' rotation, will always be pitching in the spot of a No. 2 or 3 starter.

Raul Ibanez will turn 37 during the first year of his new three-year deal with the Phillies and finish it at age 39. He's very similar to the player he's replacing, Pat Burrell. But Ibanez is four years older, is a far worse defensive player and -- outside of a blip in 2008 -- does not hit left-handed pitching. (His OPS against left-handers was .868 in 2008 but was .650 in 2007 and .661 in 2006.)

If the Phillies were willing to give this contract to Ibanez, they should have offered it to Burrell, who at least is less likely to fall off a cliff offensively and would have kept their lineup a little more balanced. The difference in 2009 will be slight, but by 2011, there's a good chance Ibanez will be just an albatross, both financially and defensively.

The most absurd part of this signing is the fact that the Phillies decided not to offer arbitration to Burrell, who also had a Type A designation, meaning the Phils could have either brought him back on a one-year deal or received two high draft picks if he signed elsewhere. If Burrell had accepted (the deadline was earlier this week), the Phillies would have had Burrell on every general manager's favorite Christmas gift, a one-year contract, which limits the team's downside risk and might even provide a boost by putting the player into another walk year. If Burrell had not accepted, which seems likely for a number of reasons, the Phillies would have been set up to receive two draft picks, a compensatory pick and probably a late first-rounder or early second-rounder. It would have been a win either way, so signing a very similar player to a three-year contract without getting the picks for Burrell is plain ol' mismanagement. And to make matters worse, the move cost the Phillies their own first-round draft pick. We're talking about the scouting staff that drafted top prospects Michael Taylor, Dominic Brown, Jason Donald and Lou Marson in the past few years, as well as Adrian Cardenas and Josh Outman, both of whom were used to land Joe Blanton in a midseason trade. The goal should be to give the scouting department more picks, not fewer, unless the move makes the big league club better, which the Burrell-for-Ibanez tradeoff does not.

The signing of Ibanez gives the market for all-bat-no-glove hitters a benchmark for future negotiations, which might ease the way for Adam Dunn, Burrell and Bobby Abreu to sign over the next week or two. The Mets, Nationals and White Sox are known to be interested in at least one of those players, and the Dodgers could jump in if they don't sign Manny Ramirez. It also clears one more player out of the market if the White Sox do wish to trade Jermaine Dye, whose defense has gone from plus to minus over the past few years.

If the Mets get the healthy J.J. Putz -- he missed time with rib and elbow injuries in 2008 -- they might actually have acquired the best closer of their offseason, one even better than their new capital-C closer, Francisco Rodriguez.

Putz, who likely will be asked to man the eighth inning, pitches between 92 and 95 mph and runs it up faster than that once in a while; his fastball has good life, but it plays up because he pairs it with a plus splitter with a hard, late bottom. He pounds the strike zone -- he walked fewer batters in 2006 and 2007 combined than K-Rod has in any single season of his career -- and misses bats. In other words, Putz is exactly what you want in a late-game reliever, and his presence on the roster means the Mets can cope with K-Rod's one-inning maximum and can avoid using him on too many consecutive days.

The Mets also have picked up outfielder Jeremy Reed, a defensive specialist who makes a lot of contact but lacks power and patience, and right-handed ground-ball machine Sean Green, who should benefit from the left side of the Mets' infield as long as manager Jerry Manuel keeps him away from too many lefties.

And most importantly, the Mets gave up little or nothing in value for them, as everyone they traded was either unlikely to contribute in New York or blocked by other players, with the exception of one minor league arm.

Seattle gets a whole mess of players, including some prospects, in return. The most recognizable name is Aaron Heilman, a pretty good setup man earlier in his career who has become mistake-prone, particularly with fastball location; his changeup has a splitter-like tumble and is a potential out pitch if he gets his head on straight. Getting out of New York should help.

The Mariners also receive Franklin Gutierrez, a plus defensive outfielder who can play all over but who has poor pitch recognition and doesn't hit right-handed pitching; Ezequiel Carrera, a very fast fourth-outfielder prospect from the Mets who lacks power and has a below-average arm; big league extra outfielder Endy Chavez; left-handed pitcher Jason Vargas, who seems to be permanently out of shape and has an average fastball, a good changeup and a cross-body delivery that limits his command; and first-base prospect Mike Carp, a skilled player who is a little slow but should get on base enough to compensate for average or fringe-average power.

The last player Seattle receives is the deal's sleeper, Maikel Cleto, a 19-year-old right-hander from the Mets' system who pitches between 95 and 97 mph but whose main secondary pitch, a slider, is still a work in progress. He could end up a dominant late-game reliever if the slider comes on with more experience.

It's a quick restocking of upper-level contributors for the Mariners, although for upside in this trade, they're limited to Cleto, to some degree Carp and perhaps a rejuvenated Heilman, who could be flipped later in the year or next offseason for younger players.

Cleveland has done a little asset management here, flipping Gutierrez for Joe Smith, a low-slot, right-handed specialist who's a step below Green and can pitch for Cleveland in 2009, and Luis Valbuena, a slightly bad-bodied second baseman with a good idea at the plate and some doubles power. Valbuena could end up an average big league second baseman, but conditioning is going to remain an issue for him over the long run.

The Tigers get a potential upside play in Edwin Jackson, albeit one who's shown a lot of downside in his career, while the Rays get a partial solution to their right-field hole in Matt Joyce.

Jackson has an electric arm and is able to hold his velocity for 100 pitches, touching 97 or 98 late in the game and sitting in the mid-90s. His hard slider has good tilt with a break that starts early and deepens as the ball travels; he also flashes a below-average breaking ball.

His arm is quick, but there's some effort in the delivery. It's top-of-the-rotation stuff, but Jackson simply does not command either the fastball or the slider, and hitters make far too much contact given the quality of his two main pitches. After two mediocre-to-bad years as a starter, Jackson probably is due for a shot in the bullpen, where Detroit is deficient and manager Jim Leyland has had a lot of success with pitchers who have failed elsewhere.

Joyce profiles as at least a part-time outfielder who needs a caddie against left-handed pitchers but who hits against right-handed pitchers very well and could be part of a very productive and cheap corner-outfield platoon.

Joyce's best attribute as a hitter is his sneaky raw power, as he's not a big guy but has above-average pull power; he could hit 20-plus homers if given enough playing time. He takes a big cut and will swing and miss on his fair share of pitches, leading to inordinate hand-wringing over his strikeouts, but he works the count enough to post an acceptable on-base percentage from the left side.

Joyce is not futile against left-handers, but he's at enough of a disadvantage that a right-handed platoon mate is probably called for. He should be part of a two-headed right-field monster for the Rays, who have shown an ability to find productive yet cost-effective solutions when they don't have the cash available to play in the free-agent market.

By signing CC Sabathia, the Yankees used their financial advantage wisely this time. They acquired the best pitcher available in free agency, a welcome change from the philosophy earlier this decade that saddled them with Carl Pavano and Jaret Wright and their medical bills, which accounted for 23 percent of all U.S. spending on health care in 2006 and 2007.

The Yankees' main problem in 2008 -- other than the Rays -- was the implosion of their rotation. They gave Phil Hughes and Ian Kennedy rotation slots to begin the season, but Hughes ended up injured and Kennedy was ineffective. Chien-Ming Wang had been a lock for 200 quality innings until he hurt his foot running the bases in an interleague game against the Astros in June -- yet another point in favor of implementing the DH in both leagues -- an injury that cost the Yankees 110-120 innings from him. Even a resurgent final act from Mike Mussina wasn't enough to overcome a full season's worth of starts from Darrell Rasner and Sidney Ponson.

Sabathia's addition fills one of those vacant spots, and given the problems the Yankees had finding even replacement-level fill-ins for their injured starters, he's comfortably worth six wins to the team next year (and probably for several years beyond that, as well).

The problem for the Yankees is the so-called "opt-out clause," better understood as a player option. The Yankees gave Sabathia a three-year deal, and Sabathia then has a four-year option worth roughly $100 million. Player options are universally awful for the signing clubs: They cede control of a big portion of a team's payroll to the player, and they represent a pure downside play, since the player will choose to stay only if he isn't performing well or if he gets injured. There's never a good reason to give a player an opt-out clause, and giving a player one as long as four years is (I believe) unprecedented and (I know) a terrible idea.

Sabathia alone doesn't make the Yankees a favorite to make the playoffs or even finish in the top two in their division. The addition of Sabathia gives the Yankees a potentially strong front three in their rotation with him, Wang and Joba Chamberlain, if his shoulder is back at full strength; if they reserve the fifth spot for Hughes, who needs to pitch in the big leagues at some point in 2009 to resume his development, they still need to add another starter, particularly given the uncertainty over how many innings Chamberlain will be able to provide. They're also still light offensively; they finished in the middle of the American League in runs scored last year, and their only additions for 2009 will be Nick Swisher and more playing time from Jorge Posada. They don't have an everyday center fielder on the roster, and they have to hope that Xavier Nady doesn't regress to platoon-player status or that Robinson Cano returns to his late-2007 level of production.

The departure of Sabathia does give Milwaukee the Yankees' first-round pick (25th or 26th, depending on whether Seattle signs relief pitcher Josh Fields) as well as a compensatory pick after the first round, but it leaves the Brewers with what might charitably be described as a non-contender's rotation. If they're not able to sign or acquire another starter this offseason, it's hard to see them on the level of the Cardinals, never mind a Cubs team that might have Jake Peavy in its rotation.

I don't mean to put any pressure on the kid, but they might as well just rename Baltimore "Wietersville" and get it over with. In a trade with the Reds in which Baltimore received Ryan Freel and minor league infielders Justin Turner and Brandon Waring for Ramon Hernandez, the Orioles netted a useful, if slightly expensive, utility player in Freel. But the primary long-term purpose of the move was to clear a spot for Baseball America 2008 Minor League Player of the Year, switch-hitting catcher Matt Wieters, who could probably start 2009 in the majors but will certainly be ready by midyear.

Freel had a three-year run as a good utility player who could get on base and fill holes in center or in the middle infield, but he has played less than a full season over the past two years because of injuries. Assuming the hamstring injury hasn't robbed him of his speed, he has value on the field and should attract trade interest in July.

Given the number of teams looking for catching help, it's a bit surprising that Baltimore couldn't get a package including at least one solid prospect. Turner is probably an extra guy in the majors, although with a little luck he could turn into an everyday second baseman. He is a well-below-average runner who makes a lot of contact but doesn't have power or hit many line drives. He can't be a utility player because he can't play short. Waring is an organizational outfielder with atrocious plate discipline; he struck out in more than one-third of his 2008 at-bats despite being old (23) for the Midwest League.

Freel was superfluous in Cincinnati, where the Reds already have more outfielders than they can use (once they acknowledge that Edwin Encarnacion can't play third), and they didn't give up any prospects they're likely to miss. They haven't gotten any offense from their catchers since 2006. Cincinnati catchers hit .234 BA/.330 OBP/.351 SLG in 2008 and .227/.286/.388 in 2007 -- a bar so low that Hernandez has cleared it in the past two years despite not hitting all that well himself. The problem with Hernandez is that his defense has gone in the tank the past two years, and he doesn't play with much energy at a position that demands it. It's possible that his contract year and diminished prospects will provide the kick in the shorts he needs, but that's a bit of a gamble for the Reds.

The signing of Francisco Rodriguez addresses one of the Mets' biggest weaknesses, adding probably three wins of value over the Mets' in-house options for late-game relief. It doesn't finish their bullpen -- and they still need to add a starter (Derek Lowe?) -- but it clearly makes them better.

On the plus side, the Mets signed the safest closer on the market in K-Rod. Their last foray into the free-agent closer market, with Billy Wagner, didn't work out, as Wagner -- who'd had only one serious arm injury in his career before coming to the Mets -- got hurt. Rodriguez has never been on the disabled list and has made at least 64 appearances in every year since his first full season, when he appeared in 59 games in 2003 but was often used for multiple innings. If Rodriguez gets hurt, the Mets can at least point to the clean health record, whereas signing Kerry Wood -- who has significantly better stuff and a better short-term track record of missing bats -- brought more risk, both actual health risk and the risk of a backlash if Wood's arm fell off.

En Español

Read Keith Law's take in Spanish on ESPNdeportes.com.

There are some red flags with Rodriguez that the switch in leagues won't fully obscure. Rodriguez's velocity has been in decline for several years now, and he's added a changeup while reducing his use of his best pitch, the sharp slider that was his out pitch in the early years of his career. The deprecation of his slider has led to a decline in his strikeout rate, from 33.1 percent of opposing hitters in 2006 to a career-worst 26.7 percent in 2008. The drop in velocity and concerns about the violence in his delivery make him a potential injury risk in spite of the health record, much as scouts and executives saw B.J. Ryan, who had never spent a day of his pro career on the DL prior to signing with the Blue Jays, as a breakdown risk when he was a free agent after 2005. Rodriguez was limited to a maximum of one inning in 2008, which both limits his value to the Mets and makes you wonder if the Angels were concerned about something specific in K-Rod's arm.

The contract will run four years if Rodriguez stays healthy enough to trigger the vesting option, which will probably put him at $13-14 million in 2012. Note that Rodriguez does not have to be effective to trigger the option -- merely healthy enough to pitch -- so it's better to think of this as a four-year deal with an insurance clause in case he should blow out in the first three years. Four years is a long deal for any reliever, but it's particularly so for a reliever who's showing some signs of decline and is probably a worse-than-even bet to be worth $13-14 million four years down the road.

The Angels are now in line to receive the Mets' first-round pick plus a compensatory pick after the first round, which will help them restock a farm system that has thinned out over the past few years. (If the Mets sign Lowe, the Angels will still receive the Mets' first-round pick and the Dodgers will receive the Mets' second-round pick.) The Angels could slide Jose Arredondo into the closer role and continue to let Scot Shields set up, and they might be a fit for a free-agent reliever who could fill the spot Arredondo would vacate.

The trade of Gerald Laird to the Tigers gets Detroit an inexpensive everyday catcher, but one with limited upside, and at a pretty significant cost in minor league pitching.

Laird might peak as a league-average offensive catcher -- the league average is pretty low these days -- but his primary value to Detroit is as a defensive catcher with a good arm and good receiving skills. He has fringe-average power and has never shown much plate discipline.

Texas gets two minor league arms: a near-term prospect and a long-term flier. The near-term guy is 25-year-old Guillermo Moscoso, an oft-injured right-hander with an above-average fastball that he locates extremely well. His off-speed pitches (a curve and changeup) are both below-average, and there isn't much projection left because of his age, but because he will bump 93 mph and commands his fastball well, he has a chance to make an impact as a short reliever. One red flag: Moscoso is an extreme fly-ball pitcher headed to a park that favors power, especially left-handed power.

The long-term guy, and the potential steal here, is Carlos Melo. He is just 17 years old with no pro experience beyond the Dominican Summer League. Melo, who signed for $175,000 last summer, sits 90-96 with a loose, quick arm.

His secondary stuff is all projection at this point, but bear in mind that the Rangers might be the best team at identifying amateur talent in Latin America and have used that knowledge to find throw-ins for trades the past two years. They landed their top prospect, Neftali Feliz, in one of those trades, and toolsy outfielder Engel Beltre in another. Of course, Melo is just a baby in baseball terms, and the odds are against his staying healthy and developing into a big leaguer, but the strategy of collecting as many arms like his as possible and figuring enough will pan out is a sound one.

The move still leaves Texas with three players capable of catching every day for someone in 2009: Taylor Teagarden, Jarrod Saltalamacchia and Max Ramirez. They'd like to move one of those three players to add some major league-ready pitching, as the absurd wave of young arms heading for the Rangers is still at least a half-season from hitting the shore.

The signing of Edgar Renteria makes the Giants more competitive in 2009 and probably 2010, but at no cost to the generally bright long-term picture in San Francisco. He doesn't cost them a draft pick and won't be blocking any major prospects. And if you believe that the Renteria of the last two months of the 2008 season, when he hit .299/.340/.493, is closer to his actual level of ability (as he showed up out of shape in spring training and wasn't really in shape until late July), then it's a minor bargain for the Giants.

Yes, the Giants have shortstop Manny Burriss, who hit an unimpressive .283/.357/.329 in limited time in the big leagues in 2008, but has a weak swing and poor pitch recognition that make even that level a near-term high-water mark for him. (His walk rate was partly boosted by appearances in the No. 8 spot, where he'd be pitched around to get to the pitcher.) There's no one else in the Giants' organization who could handle shortstop in 2009, and frankly, they're a little light at second base as well, so they could just as easily sign another shortstop and slide Renteria to second, where he's going to end up in the next few years anyway. If he stays in shape and even hits .280/.330/.440, he'll have trade value next winter or during 2010, as well.

The point worth emphasizing here is the complete change in operating philosophy for the Giants over the past 12 months. GM Brian Sabean and his staff appear committed to a rebuilding project, and are working to fit short-term contention (or at least respectability) into the rebuilding plan, rather than following the old plan of deliberately giving away draft picks and fielding the oldest team permitted under American labor laws. Granted, they could trade Jonathan Sanchez for Jorge Cantu, at which point I'll take it all back, but for now, the glass is half-full.

Javier Vazquez comes to Atlanta for one good prospect, a wild-card arm, and some filler.

"Big Game Javy" is a durable mid-rotation starter, good for 200 innings a year, still young at 31, and maddening in his inability to meet expectations based on his peripheral stats. He sits 90-93 mph, bumping 94, without much movement. He tends to miss in the upper-middle part of the zone two or three times a game, and because he defaults to his fastball when he's behind in the count, it results in some very hard-hit balls. He works with three off-speed pitches -- slider, curve and changeup -- none plus, both breaking balls around average, the change slightly below, and has better control than command; his 59 unintentional walks this year actually his made up his highest total since his rookie year in 1998.

Vazquez actually ranks ninth among active starters in strikeouts, 14th in innings pitched, 13th in fewest walks per nine innings … and 11th in home runs allowed, behind eight pitchers aged 40 and up. He holds the patent on the Really Bad Pitch and is currently litigating for trademark rights to the term "One Bad Inning," all of which seems small beans now that his former manager, Ozzie Guillen, has tagged Vazquez as unable to pitch in big games.

In the six-player trade, Atlanta also gets Boone Logan, a low-slot lefty specialist who almost shot-puts the ball to the plate. He tops out at 91 mph and his slider doesn't have great tilt, so he's limited to platoon duty and is going to be prone to the long ball. But he could have a good run as a one-out lefty, and he's cheap for 2009 and under control for three years after that. Logan is interesting if for no other reason than the fact that he has thrown only 5 1/3 innings between short-season ball and Triple-A.

The package going back to the White Sox relies heavily on one prospect, breakout slugger Tyler Flowers, to make it a solid return. Brent Lillibridge is a nice utility player who can handle playing shortstop, second or center field but who is little more than a slap-hitter without good secondary skills, limiting his upside to a bench role. Third baseman Jon Gilmore is a moderate-tools prospect with very limited feel, below-average speed, and a limited power ceiling; he reminds me of Ryan Sweeney, another player from Iowa who was hyped as an amateur beyond what his actual tools merited.

The wild card for Chicago is left-hander Santos Rodriguez, a Gulf Coast League repeater with an outstanding arm. He's a long, lanky kid whose fastball sits 95-96 mph, and he shows some feel for a breaking ball. The delivery isn't pretty, and his command is still well below average, so he probably projects as a reliever. But his upside, even in the pen, is substantial, although his probability of reaching it right now given his inexperience and delivery is not that high.

Flowers, on the other hand, is going to produce offensively at the big-league level, possibly as soon as 2010. It's not quite the way you'd draw it up -- he bars his front arm slightly with his hands all the way back and takes an all-out swing -- but he has a very good eye and raw power, particularly to left and left-center. (His 17 home runs may not look impressive, but Myrtle Beach -- high Class A -- is a horrible place to hit.) He may not hit for a high average -- I'd like to see him prove he can catch up to better fastballs, as his bat speed isn't great on top of where he starts his hands -- but he'll post a high OBP and should be a 25-plus home run guy when he's established in the majors, perhaps more in a homer-friendly park like Chicago's. Flowers' drawback is behind the plate, where he's slow and blocky and has a fringe-average arm; he'll never be a defensive asset, but the White Sox have lived with A.J. Pierzynski back there for years and won a World Series with him, so they don't seem likely to overvalue defense at catcher. If Flowers reaches or comes near his ceiling, he alone is a good return on two years of Vazquez at a slightly below-market $11 million per year. But if Flowers can't catch or has too much trouble making contact at higher levels, the rest of the package isn't likely to make up for it.

The Astros signed Mike Hampton to a one-year deal, pending a physical exam. The salary Hampton will receive has yet to be announced.

It's a good fit for both sides. Houston just needs some starting pitching depth, and although Hampton is, at best, a back-of-the-rotation starter, if he can stay healthy (stop laughing), he should be exactly that and could soak up some innings around the inevitable DL stint because he throws strikes and gets ground balls.

Houston's park favors right-handed power hitters, but Hampton has long been more effective against right-handed batters, and he keeps the ball down. Astros GM Ed Wade has indicated that he still hasn't been given a firm payroll figure for 2009 -- whenever you're ready, Drayton McLane, we'll just hold the offseason for you -- so signing Hampton is a sensible budget move to ensure that the Astros don't rely too much on the Chris Sampsons of the world to fill out their rotation.

Junichi Tazawa has now reportedly signed a term sheet with Boston, meaning that as long as he passes a physical he'll be a member of the Red Sox. Tazawa apparently turned down more money -- perhaps significantly more, depending on where Boston's final offer landed between $3 million and $6 million -- from other clubs, signing with the team that had been scouting him as early as last year.

Signing Tazawa was a no-brainer for the Red Sox. If he was an American college player eligible for next June's draft, at worst he'd be taken in the top two rounds, and I think it's likely he'd go in the back half or third of the first round. Boston has to burn a spot on its 40-man roster on him, but they had two spots open already and have at least two or three players they could outright if they need the room.

He's not major-league ready, having only pitched in an amateur industrial league in Japan, but he should be ready to start in Double-A and could see the majors in late 2009 if all goes well. His splitter (or split-change) should give minor-league hitters nightmares, but he'll need to work on his fastball command. If his breaking ball doesn't come along, he projects more as a plus two-pitch reliever than as a starter.

Assuming that today's report in the Boston Globe of a $3 million price tag is accurate, it raises the question of why Tazawa would turn down higher-valued offers. One source indicated to me that Tazawa wanted to play alongside his idol, Daisuke Matsuzaka, but is something that fickle -- major-league players are traded all the time -- worth leaving as much as $4 million on the table? Tazawa had the opportunity that American-born amateur players would kill to get: He could shop his services to any team with no restrictions and receive his actual market value rather than an artificially depressed figure dictated by the Commissioner's Office. For most amateur players, their initial signing bonuses represent the bulk of the money they'll earn in professional baseball, so it is in Tazawa's interest to try to maximize his bonus payment now. Even so, at $3 million, he earned more than most drafted players receive in signing bonuses, and I expect the agents for the top college starters in next year's class -- Steve Strasburg, Alex White, Aaron Crow, Andy Oliver, et al -- to try to use that figure as a mere starting point for negotiations.